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EQUAL MARRIAGE RIGHTS
FOR TRANSGENDERED INDIVIDUALS
By Parker Thoeni* 
The prevailing view on marriage is premised on a binary conceptualization of the sexual characteristics of the two adults involved.  This approach is typified by the 
Defense of Marriage Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1996, 
which limits marriage to the legal union of one man and one 
woman for the purposes of federal law.1  Considering the        
medical facts about this topic, however, it becomes apparent that 
there are a plethora of scenarios where two consenting adults 
who wish to be married do not fit into the categorically binary 
definition of marriage between a man and a woman.2  Just as in 
the 2004 case Deane v. Conaway, where nine same-sex couples 
and a man whose partner had recently passed away un-
successfully challenged a Maryland law which denied same-sex 
couples the right to marry,3 transsexual or transgendered        
individuals could take issue with being precluded from marriage 
on the basis of sex. The scarcity of these challenges most likely 
stems from the unfortunate consequences of a history of social 
and official discrimination and isolation severe enough to keep 
citizens from coming out of the woodwork.4 This article analyzes 
the Maryland Family Law’s restriction on the marriage rights of 
transgendered individuals. 
SEX AND GENDER
For the purposes of this article, the term “transgender” 
means having personal 
characteristics that tran-
scend traditional gender 
boundaries and correspond-
ing sexual norms.5 The 
traditional binary model of 
sex and  gender, emerging 
from the Middle Ages, 
shoehorns individuals into 
the categorical role of 
“male” or “female.” During 
those early times, intersex        
individuals were forced to choose one of the two established 
gender roles, with the penalties for transgression  being as seri-
ous as death.6   
Medical experts today recognize that many factors                
contribute to the determination of an individual’s sex, including 
the presence of sexual organs, facial and chest hair or breasts, 
“sexual identity (one’s own sense of one’s sexual identity),          
gender identity (the gender society would attribute to an           
individual), and gender role (the extent to which one chooses to 
live in one’s self-identified sex).”7  While most individuals do 
not find any inconsistencies between these factors in their          
identification as a male or female, there is some ambiguity       
between these factors for transgendered individuals and others.8
The relationship between sex and gender is thus not always a 
binary concept limited to all male or all female.9  Neither are the 
terms “sex” and “gender” always synonymous; “sex” refers to 
one’s anatomy and biological function in reproduction whereas 
“‘gender’ refers to psychosexual individuality or identity.”10
NON-CONGRUENT SEX CHARACTERISTICS
The initial development of a fetus is asexual, followed by 
the formation of rudimentary sexual organs based on the pres-
ence or absence of a Y chromosome.11  When the sexual devel-
opment of the fetus is changed or interrupted, people are born 
with sexual features that are either ambiguous (inconsistent with 
either “male” or “female” characteristics) or incongruent 
(inconsistent with their assigned sex).12  Doctors in the past com-
monly believed that a person was psychosexually neutral at birth 
and that the development after birth was dependent on the ap-
pearance of the person’s genitals.13  The medical community no 
longer accepts this view, and many researchers believe that a 
person’s brain differentiates in utero to one gender or the other.14
This offers a “biological explanation for transsexualism the brain 
has differentiated to one sex while the body has differentiated to 
another.”15
At ages as young as three or four years old, many            
transsexual individuals may 
begin to believe they have 
grown up with the wrong 
genitalia and proceed to 
rebel against the social or-
der imposed upon them, 
r e f u s i n g  t o  w e a r 
“appropriate” clothes or      
participate in activities        
associated with their gen-
der.16  Even so, “the official 
designation of a person as 
male or female usually  occurs at or immediately after birth, and 
is  often based on the appearance of the  external genitalia.”17               
 Transgendered individuals who wish to bring their sex char-
acteristics into alignment with either the male or female catego-
ries have limited options. These include psychotherapy, living as 
a person of the assigned sex, hormonal treatment, and sex reas-
signment surgery.18  “Estimates of the number of intersexed indi-
viduals vary considerably, from 1 per 37,000 people to as high as 
1 per 2,000 people.”19   
Regardless of the nature of an individual’s inconsistent or 
ambiguous sex characteristics, and regardless of the treatment 
they may undergo, a transgendered individual may one day wish 
Regardless of the nature of an individual’s              
inconsistent or ambiguous sex characteristics, 
and regardless of the treatment they may undergo, 
a transgendered individual may one day wish to 
make a lifelong commitment to another
consenting adult and  enter into the union of
marriage with that adult.
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to make a lifelong commitment to another consenting adult and 
enter into the union of marriage with that adult.  Although the 
Maryland Family Law currently burdens, arguably to the point 
of preclusion, transgendered individuals’ marriage rights, legal 
discrimination based on sex is forbidden by Maryland’s state 
constitution.20
FAMILY LAW AND EQUAL RIGHTS IN MARYLAND
 While states have approached marriage issues in a variety of 
ways, from banning same-sex marriages by constitutional 
amendment to finding prohibitions on same-sex marriage to 
violate a number of constitutional provisions, the best analysis 
of transgender marriage rights in Maryland rests on the            
application of the state’s Equal Rights Amendment (hereinafter 
“ERA”).  By avoiding the issue of fundamental due process 
rights to marriage and privacy,21 and by avoiding application of 
the rational basis standard of review, courts in Maryland leave 
the decision to usurp the ERA to the people through a           
constitutional amendment.  Such actions have failed to pass 
through the legislative branch.22
 The ERA, passed by the legislature and ratified by voters in 
1972, became Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights 
and states that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be 
abridged or denied because of sex.”23  The historical denial of 
equal rights for women preceding the ERA reveals the basic 
principle of the ERA; sex is not a permissible factor in determin-
ing legal rights.24 The ERA 
recognized that preserving the 
status quo could mean stigma-
tizing a class of people based 
on mistaken reliance on        
internalized stereotypes rather 
than on medical facts.25 Mary-
land’s ERA may have   mistak-
enly internalized the binary 
notion that sex is limited to “male” and “female.”26  But without 
a doubt, the concept of sex incorporates, if not turns on, gender 
identity.27
 Under the ERA, sex- and gender-based classifications are 
considered suspect, subject to strict scrutiny.28  The Maryland 
Court of Appeals initially interpreted the language of Article 46 
as clear and unambiguous.29  Since that point, the court has 
stated, “because of [Article 46], classifications based on gender 
are suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.”30  While this standard 
“flatly prohibits gender-based classifications, absent substantial 
justification,”31 the court has clarified that the ERA forbids the 
determination of rights solely on the basis of one’s sex.32
 Maryland Family Law § 2-201, however, states that “[o]nly 
a marriage between a man and a woman is valid in this State.”33
To the extent that § 2-201 is intended to benefit men and 
women, and in effect primarily benefits only men and women, it 
imposes some additional burden, inconvenience and expense to 
transgendered individuals by forcing them to “pass” as a man or 
a woman in order to reap the benefits of marriage.  The ERA, 
however, mandates that transgendered individuals be granted the 
right to marry a consenting individual of their choice because 
classifications based on sex are considered suspect and thus  
subject to strict scrutiny, and because § 2-201 is a sex-based 
classification on its face. Section 2-201 is a sex-based           
classification on its face because it grants different rights to men 
and women, and it burdens the marriage rights of transgendered 
individuals. In addition, laws precluding transgendered         
individuals from marrying a consenting adult are not narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.  Just as a 
statute that benefits males at the expense of everyone else     
violates the ERA, a statute that benefits males and females at the 
expense of everyone else violates the ERA. 
 The government may make a gender-based classification 
only when it can show that the classification is narrowly tailored 
to achieve compelling state goals.34  Whenever a law refers to an 
individual’s gender on its face, the state must have a compelling 
reason for doing so; the theory of “equal application” has been 
rejected in Maryland.35 Application of the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review inevitably leads to the conclusion that transgen-
dered individuals are eligible to enjoy the same benefits of mar-
riage as all other individuals in Maryland. 
REJECTION OF THE “EQUAL APPLICATION” THEORY
 Even though both men and women have the right to marry 
someone of the opposite sex, § 2-201 is a sex-based classifica-
tion because Maryland has re-
jected the “equal application” 
theory as   unpersuasive. Article 
24, the due process clause of 
the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights,36 does not contain an 
express equal protection clause, 
but Maryland courts have long 
recognized that the due process 
clause implicitly guarantees equal protection similar to the equal  
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal 
constitution in both manner and  extent.37
 Because it could not realistically be contended that the peo-
ple, in adding the ERA, intended to repeat what was already 
contained in Article 24, Maryland courts have interpreted Arti-
cle 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights as developing one 
of those differences: “segregation based upon sex, absent sub-
stantial justification, violates the [ERA], just as segregation 
based upon race violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”38  The 
divergence here from the federal notion of equal protection is 
the treatment of sex as a suspect class, not the manner in which 
equal protection is applied to a suspect class.39  Thus, Mary-
land’s strict scrutiny standard likely incorporates federal stan-
dards that rejected the “equal application” and “separate but 
equal” theories with respect to suspect classes.40  Indeed, the 
rejection of the “separate but equal” theory, limiting the term 
“marriage” to a relationship between a man and a woman, would 
be a sex-based classification.   
Application of the strict scrutiny standard      
of review inevitably leads to the conclusion 
that transgendered individuals are eligible      
to enjoy the same benefits of marriage
as all other individuals in Maryland. 
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 Even if Maryland accepted the theories of “equal             
application” and “separate but equal,” limiting the definition of 
sex to the binary categories of “all 
male” and “all female,” the resulting 
scheme would inherently exclude 
people from  marriage on the basis 
of sex.  As race is more than just 
black or white, so is sex more than 
just male or female.  The “equal   
application”  argument that all indi-
viduals are free to marry someone of the “opposite sex,”41 is just 
as faulty and non-sensical as an argument that all individuals are 
free to marry someone of the “opposite race.”  To avoid a dis-
criminatory      classification, the word “opposite” must be re-
placed with the word “any.”   
By assuming that all people are either purely male or purely 
female, proponents of the equal application theory attempt to 
force a square peg into a round hole. Just as a law defining  mar-
riage as only between two white people would  burden some 
white people (those wishing to marry someone non-white) and 
all non-white people, a law defining marriage as only between a 
man and a woman burdens some men and women, and all trans-
gendered individuals who do not fit those categories.  Thus, 
even if the equal application theory were accepted, it does not 
apply.  
A SUSPECT CLASS OF TRANSGENDERED INDIVIDUALS
 Those who fall outside the male/female dichotomy and are 
therefore left without marriage rights should be considered a 
suspect class.42 Under Maryland equal protection, a “suspect 
class is a category of people who have experienced a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment or been subjected to unique      
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly 
indicative of their abilities.”43  The long history of purposeful 
unequal treatment of transgendered people is unquestionable.44
Transgendered individuals are thus a suspect class, and the 
Maryland Family Law should be reviewed under strict scrutiny 
instead of rational basis review.45  Because § 2-201 makes a 
gender-based classification on its face, it must be narrowly      
tailored to achieve compelling state interests.46
 There are no compelling government interests furthered by 
narrowly tailored means when marriage is limited as between a 
man and a woman.  Thus, the best way to define marriage is 
between two individuals, rather than conditioning marriage 
rights on any sexual characteristics. 
 Though the government in Deane failed to assert a            
compelling interest in restricting marriage rights on the basis of 
sex, the true legislative intent of § 2-201 of prohibiting same-sex 
marriages can easily be derived from the face of the statute.47
Any attempt to justify this government interest as compelling 
should fail, and a marriage statute that defines marriage on the 
basis of sex is not narrowly tailored to meet any government 
interest that is valid under the ERA.  In Deane, the government 
asserted an interest in promoting traditional family units and 
preserving traditional societal values.48
 Promoting a traditional family unit that encourages         
procreation is neither compelling nor 
narrowly tailored because it is based 
on the presumption that people who 
do not fit into the traditional binary 
sex system, even to the extent that 
only their sexual orientation differs, 
are not similarly situated to those 
who do so with respect to raising a 
child.  However, the ERA does not allow the presumption that a 
man or a woman is better suited to raise a child of a certain sex, 
so it likewise bars the presumption that a man or a woman is 
better suited to raise any child.49  Therefore, ERA also bars the  
presumption that a male-female couple is better suited to raise a 
child than any other  ouple, without respect to sex. 
 To the extent that procreation is argued to be natural, such 
an argument is based on internalized stereotypes that fail to  
recognize that individuals are born with sex characteristics that 
do not fit the binary mold.50  Regardless, §2-201 is not narrowly 
tailored to meet that goal because it does not claim to invalidate 
marriages because the couple cannot or has not chosen to      
procreate.
 Any argument that these conclusions are counter to societal 
values and tradition is misplaced.  The traditional notion of  
marriage is a thorn in the foot of Maryland’s overarching tradi-
tions of tolerance and protection of minorities.  One instance in 
which the state may permissibly grant benefits on the basis of 
sex arises where women seek remedies to past wrongs.  Such        
remedies are similar to those allowed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment in instances of racial classifications.51  The long 
denial of equal rights to women that prompted the ERA has  
indeed applied to women’s marriage rights, and those inequities 
have since been equalized.52  For example, there may very well 
be compelling government interests in providing women with a 
remedy for past discrimination from male sports.53  Of course, if 
the classification included anyone other than women, and lasted 
longer than necessary to remedy the past wrongs, it would not 
be narrowly tailored to the class of individuals discriminated.      
Even if the exclusion of homosexuals from marriage were a 
compelling interest, marriage, as defined between a man and a 
woman, is not narrowly tailored because it is under-inclusive 
Maryland’s marriage statute does not       
pass muster in limiting marriage rights
to men and women because the means by 
which  people are identified as men or 
women are not made clear enough to be
considered narrowly tailored. 
As race is more than just black 
or white, so is sex more than  
just male or female.
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and over-inclusive.  Maryland’s marriage statute does not pass 
muster in limiting marriage rights to men and women because 
the means by which people are identified as men or women are 
not made clear enough to be considered narrowly tailored.  
While § 2-201 uses the words “man” and “woman,” it fails to 
offer a definition of either.  Section 2-201 does not require any 
showing of sex.  Section 2-402 of the Maryland Family Law 
requires details such as name, address, prior relationship, social 
security number, and age, leaving it to the clerk to withhold  
licenses if he or she feels that there may be legal reasons why 
applicants for a marriage license should not be married under 
the Maryland Family Law.54  By granting marriage rights to 
“men” and to “women” without offering a sufficient mechanism 
with which to define a “man” or a “woman,” § 2-201 at least 
burdens, and potentially precludes, transgendered individuals 
from getting married because of their gender identity              
differences, and more specifically, because of sex.55
 The Maryland Court of Appeals recently held that           
individuals must be allowed to change their birth certificates to 
reflect their sex identity; however, it first required evidence of a 
“permanent and irreversible change” from male to female.56
The court in In re Heilig required a showing based on medical 
facts, but carefully avoided concluding that surgery would be 
the only permissible medical fact.57  Requiring any showing of 
sex, sex change or congruency between sex and gender            
characteristics as a condition to marriage, shows that any 
mechanism by which an indi-
vidual’s sex is defined for the         
purposes of marriage, is over-
broad. 
 The court in In re Heilig
found that a change in sex de-
noted on an individual’s birth 
certificate was permissible, but 
it left open the question of what 
would need to be shown to es-
tablish such a change and 
whether this change on the birth certificate would mean a 
change in sex for the purposes of marriage.  The methods used 
to determine someone’s sex for the purposes of marriage are 
presently unclear, but presumably  either the sex on a person’s 
birth certificate at birth, or as amended, or in a driver’s license, 
would be determinative.   
 Therefore, the first question regarding the determination of 
an individual’s sex for the purposes of marriage is whether         
individuals are defined as a man or a woman based on the sex 
denoted on their original birth certificates, or whether            
individuals may change their sex for the purpose of marriage.  
The second question then is what criteria should be used if an 
individual’s sex may be changed for the purposes of marriage.  
If the determination of sex does not hinge on sex as recorded at 
birth, the method of determination of sex cannot simply lead to 
the categories of male and female.   
 Marriage defined as between a man and a woman does not 
pass muster under the ERA because the relevant characteristic  
gender identity may be male, female, or neither, without  respect 
to the physical characteristics of an individual.  Reliance on the 
original birth certificate, or the genitals an individual has at 
birth, is not narrowly tailored because it focuses on mutable 
characteristics.58  Requiring a medical showing of sex change is 
not narrowly tailored because it burdens transgendered           
individuals more than others on the basis of sex by requiring a 
showing based on genitals at birth; an individual’s gender does 
not change with medical procedures.59   
 If the government does not recognize a change in sex, then 
it relies on the sex assigned at birth, which is most commonly 
based solely on the appearance of the external genitalia.  By 
failing to recognize a change in gender, the government         
implicitly allows an individual who, for example, was born with 
male sex characteristics that have since been changed to female 
sex characteristics, to marry a woman.  However, it does not 
allow an individual who was born with female sex                
characteristics, which have since been changed to male sex     
characteristics, to marry a woman.  Therefore, physical sex        
characteristics are not relevant to marriage between a man and a 
woman to the extent that the genitals with which an individual is 
born define sex. 
 If the government does recognize a change in sex, then it 
allows a person born with male sex characteristics that have 
since been changed to female sex characteristics to marry a 
woman upon a showing that 
such a change has in fact oc-
curred.  However, that change 
must occur prior to the mar-
riage.  A  person born with male 
sex characteristics could marry a 
woman, and after the marriage, 
transition to female sex  charac-
teristics.  Because the individ-
ual’s sex is not changed except 
upon a showing to a court, the       
marriage remains valid.  If a showing is not required after mar-
riage, it cannot be required prior to marriage.  Therefore, 
whether a change in sex is allowed or not, two individuals with 
the same sex characteristics may end up together in marriage if 
the government considers sex characteristics to be mutable and 
not locked at birth.   
 For the purposes of limiting marriage as between a man and 
a woman, an individual’s sex must be defined by gender iden-
tity.  However, the government does not require a showing that 
two individuals getting married have one partner who identifies 
as a male and one who identifies as a female.60
Requiring congruency between a person’s sex and gender 
characteristics lacks narrow tailoring as well.  The presence or 
absence of surgery or hormonal treatment cannot be the basis 
upon which the decision is made, because not only is gender an 
immutable characteristic, but furthermore the cost-prohibitive 
nature of surgery conditions marriage rights on the ability to pay 
The Maryland Court of Appeals recently  
held that  individuals must be allowed to 
change their birth certificates to reflect      
their sex identity; however, it first required        
evidence  of a “permanent and irreversible 
change” from male to female. 
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for a medical procedure.  Indeed, requiring congruency is not a 
narrowly tailored test because it is easily evaded by delaying 
any medical procedures.61 If consistency is to be required, then 
everyone must bear the same burden of proof, and the             
government must require from everyone a showing that their 
gender identity is consistent with their physical sex                  
characteristics.  This places the focus on the irreversible  gender 
identity rather than the changeable physical sex  characteristics. 
Requiring a showing of sex prior to marriage based on genitals 
at birth is not narrowly tailored.   
The government lacks a narrowly tailored definition of  
marriage by defining it as between a man and a woman, even as 
defined by gender identity alone, 
because it is inherently either 
under- inclusive or  over-
inclusive.  Because defining a 
person’s sex focuses on gender 
identity, and because individuals 
can have ambiguous gender 
identities,62 the scope of mar-
riage rights must be expanded to 
include those people.  However, when marriage is recognized as 
between a man and a woman, it becomes clear that accommoda-
tion of those individuals provides them with a pool of suitable 
spouses that grants them a choice of whether to marry a man or 
a woman. Because this choice may not be   limited to those indi-
viduals on the basis of sex, it must also be granted to individuals 
who identify themselves as men and women. Thus, marriage 
rights must be blind as to a person’s sex characteristics at birth 
as well as an individual’s gender identity, and should be defined 
as between two individuals, not between a man and a woman, in 
order to comply with the equal protection mandates of the ERA. 
Physical sex characteristics are not immutable, but gender 
identity is.  A focus on physical sex characteristics is therefore 
more easily evaded than a focus on gender identity and cannot 
be considered narrowly tailored.  Once the focus has shifted to 
the relevant characteristic, it becomes apparent that individuals 
whose identity does not fit within the binary sex categories do 
not have marriage rights at all, and individuals who were born 
with inconsistent sex characteristics are more burdened than 
those who were not, solely because they are a minority sex class. 
Requiring any showing of sex produces nonsensical results, and  
reliance on physical sex characteristics is not narrowly tailored 
either.  Because the asserted interests inherently cannot be        
furthered by narrowly tailored means, they are revealed as       
falling short of being compelling.  If a showing has not been 
required of course, Maryland has not concerned itself with two 
people of the same gender marrying one another.  The benefits 
of marriage may not fall solely on men and women, no matter 
how they are defined, because sex is more complex than simply 
“male” and “female.”  
PHYSICAL DIFFERENCE AS A LEGITIMATE BASIS ON
WHICH TO MAKE SEX CLASSIFICATIONS
Maryland has recognized physical differences as legitimate 
bases on which to make sex classifications.63 During isolated 
personal interactions, physical sex characteristics are most      
noticeable in the context of one-
time contacts.  Since marriage 
involves every day contact with 
a person, not just a one-time run 
in with the body of a person, and  
because the marriage contact is  
consensual, gender identification 
not physical sex characteristics 
are relevant. Physical sex char-
acteristics may be relevant to the extent that those characteristics 
are usually not revealed to the public (e.g., e.g. external genitals 
revealed to or forced upon an unconsenting individual).  Thus, 
for the purpose of sexual assault or bathroom designations, 
physical sex characteristics may be the most appropriate criteria 
on which to base different treatment.64
The court in In re Heilig noted that many courts find, for 
purposes of marriage, that an individual’s biological sexual  
constitution is fixed at birth and cannot be changed unless a  
mistake has been made at birth and later revealed by medical               
investigation.65  As the facts make clear, and because the law in 
this field should depend upon medical facts,66 when an             
individual is born, that individual’s gender identity has been 
decided.67  Thus, while basing a classification system on an  
individual’s genitals at birth may often lead to the appropriate 
classification, sometimes it will lead to a mistake, mis-
identifying an individual as a male or female based on that     
individual’s genitalia.68
Because they are “universally recognized as inherent, rather 
than chosen,” attempts to change a person’s gender identity to 
conform to physical sex characteristics have consistently 
failed.69  In addition, although they are noticeable, physical sex 
characteristics are reversible because they can be altered by way 
of hormone treatment or sex reassignment surgery, but are likely 
to be altered only to conform to gender identity, which is           
immutable.70 Indeed, sexual reassignment surgery “merely   
harmonizes a person’s physical characteristics with that        
identity.”71  Therefore, a person whose sex characteristics fit the 
binary categories and who feels that physical sex characteristics 
are immutable is correct with respect to himself or herself      
because it would counter the dictates of his or her gender          
If the government is interested in defining sex 
for the purpose of  marriage on a basis other 
than gender identity, it should do so by stating 
precisely what   sex characteristics it feels are 
relevant to marriage.  
Because defining a person’s sex focuses 
on gender identity, and because  
individuals can have ambiguous
gender identities, the scope of
marriage rights must be expanded to         
include those people.
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identity to alter their already congruent sex characteristics.  
However, this is not the case for transgendered individuals.   
If the government is interested in defining sex for the     
purpose of marriage on a basis other than gender identity, it 
should do so by stating precisely what sex characteristics it feels 
are relevant to marriage.  It would not be unreasonable to expect 
the legislature to do this.  Indeed, Maryland reconstructed its 
rape statute to define the crime based on the physical sex charac-
teristics it found, to be most naturally vulnerable.72  However, if 
sex can be said to be relevant to marriage, then the relevant 
characteristic is gender identity, not physical sex characteristics.  
To the extent that a person’s sex is defined by physical sex char-
acteristics, for the purposes of marriage, the definition does not 
fit under a “unique characteristics” exception.  
CONCLUSION
Marriage may not be limited as between a man and a 
woman, and there is no narrowly tailored definition of man and 
woman that does not exclude a class of people based on sex.  
Because requiring any showing of sex prior to marriage, or lim-
iting marriage based on genitals at birth, is not narrowly tailored 
to further a compelling government interest, defining marriage 
as between a man and a woman violates the ERA. To comply 
with the ERA, marriage should be defined as between two     
individuals, rather than as between a man and a woman.  
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